With the serial stowaway back at work and a Washington Post op-ed making the rounds, the hue and cry will likely rise again to eliminate TSA altogether.
The Post article promotes a return to airline managed privatized security at screening checkpoints, essentially resetting the clock to pre-9/11. Most of us remember how that worked out the last time.
The article raises a few valid points, but it also contains several incorrect assumptions and omits some important facts. Before we overhaul or eliminate the organization, we should fill in a few blanks.
First, the reports cited in the Post article are from 2015 and 2017. Nearly a decade old. Yet they continue to be cited as if they reflect yesterday’s performance. I agree that updated assessments are necessary, but let’s stop using 10-year-old data as the primary basis for judging today’s security system.
Second, I was in the aviation security industry both before and after 9/11. Early in my career, I worked as a screener (circa 1988), and the system was about as effective as a screen door on a submarine. It was a tragedy waiting to happen. Airlines were responsible for screening and contracted the function to private companies at the lowest possible cost.
I later left the operational security side as Assistant Director of Security at Denver International Airport and am the primary author of Practical Aviation Security (1st through 4th editions). Today’s security apparatus bears little resemblance to the pre-9/11 system.
Third, there is no evidence that private contractors before 9/11 performed better than TSA does now. In fact, 9/11 should serve as a constant reminder that the old model—airline-controlled screening with FAA oversight—failed catastrophically. There is no reason to assume airlines would somehow do better today under a similar structure.
Fourth, some ask why airports in the U.S. don’t conduct screening like certain foreign airports do. One major reason is liability. If an airport operator allows a prohibited item onto an aircraft and something catastrophic happens, that airport will be sued into oblivion. And yes, local government entities get sued all the time. I spend part of my professional life defending airports in exactly those kinds of cases.
Airports could apply for SAFETY Act protections, but that does not eliminate litigation costs. They would still spend significant time and money in court. And if airports take over screening, who pays? The money has to come from somewhere. Parking rates and concession fees would rise substantially to offset the cost.
Some foreign airport systems may operate under different liability frameworks, but that comparison is rarely examined in detail.
It’s no secret that TSA does not enjoy a glowing public reputation. When you screen nearly 3 million passengers per day and employ approximately 45,000 officers, there will be noise in the system. There will be stories about inconsistent procedures and occasional misconduct. But to suggest that pre-9/11 screening was somehow free of theft or failures is simply false.
There were significant theft problems before 9/11, including organized baggage theft rings. Weapons made it through checkpoints with alarming regularity. The old system was not a golden age of efficiency and integrity. We already saw how airline-managed screening performed, and the results were disastrous.
It is also inaccurate to imply that airports that “opt out” run their own security. Under the Screening Partnership Program, airports may request private screening personnel, but TSA selects the contractor and manages the contract. The airport operator does not control the screening function.
That said, the Screening Partnership Program has generally been successful. If it were not, TSA would terminate it. But even under a private contractor model, the system will never be perfect. Not as long as human beings are involved.
Calls to abolish TSA resurface whenever something goes wrong. That is predictable. But policy decisions should be grounded in current data, historical context, and an honest understanding of how the system actually works—not nostalgia for a model that already proved it could fail in the worst possible way.
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