I finally lived long enough to see us forget about 9/11. Maybe not all of us but at least some politicians and others seem to have forgotten about it. They continue to call for the abolishment of the TSA, seemingly without any reasonable justification or thought about why the agency exists in the first place. Some want to give screening back to the airlines, but why? It seems they are tired of undergoing the screening process that has largely protected aviation since 9/11.

Rather than name calling, obfuscation and hyperbole, which is what passes for intelligent debate in this country now, I thought I’d go old school and present a rational argument for why TSA shouldn’t be abolished. Caution, if you think this is a total TSA apologist piece you’re wrong. Keep reading. I aim to present the facts and a few different sides of the issue. Also, my goal is to assess the idea, not attack the person or people forwarding the idea.

Before 9/11

Prior to 9/11, the airlines were responsible for screening. Since security is not a revenue-generating function of an organization, they hired the lowest bidders to perform the job, and hired people at minimum wage and often from the low end of the employment pool (I know, I was a screener in the 1980s). Screeners also used ancient equipment that couldn’t detect the known threats at the time. To be fair, these same screener companies were used throughout the world, but held to much higher standards than the FAA’s, and they often achieved them.

Why was the equipment antiquated? Again, the airlines would have to pay for any security upgrades, so they consistently lobbied against increased security regulations and requirements, like cargo and checked baggage screening, upgraded x-ray and magnetometer equipment and paying a fair wage for screeners. The FAA regulated aviation security back then, but was frequently handcuffed by agency capture, which occurs when a regulatory agency, instead of serving the public interest, becomes dominated by the private industries, which leads to decisions and policies that favor industry interests over public interests.

By the time 9/11 happened we were using the lowest paid security personnel, highly permissible security rules (you could carry knives and box cutters of up to 4 inches in length on an airplane), and 1970s-era equipment. Is this the system we want to return too? The one that was exploited by 19 terrorists on September 11, 2001.

After 9/11

Shortly after 9/11 the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA) was passed, which created TSA and transferred the responsibility of screening to the federal government. The airlines were ecstatic about this because they no longer had to pay for screening (and by the way, they don’t want the responsibility back nor can they do it better).

Between 2001-2002, the TSA hired approximately 55,000+ screeners to takeover security checkpoints at U.S. commercial service airports, replacing the contract screeners (or in some cases, hiring the same contract screeners). TSA also took over the regulatory responsibility from the FAA, to ensure airlines and airports adhered to their federally mandated security programs. In 2003, the TSA was moved from under the Department of Transportation, to the newly created Department of Homeland Security, which helped the agency move somewhat away from the agency capture situation the industry had on the FAA.

Ironically, the 9/11 Commission determined that 9/11 wasn’t caused by a failure of the screeners, but a failure of the screening policy – specifically the allowance of knives on board an aircraft. So why did the federal government takeover screening if screening wasn’t the issue? The answer is the U.S. needed to get people flying again and they were reluctant to do so since the traveling public perceives the screening process to be the entire security process; plus, most everyone in the system knew that screening was an area of weakness that desperately needed a fix.

The 9/11 Commission Report supported the decision to create TSA highlighting areas where security screening and oversight needed improvement. The Report emphasized the importance of sustaining the federalized structure for airport security to ensure consistency, effectiveness, and accountability. The ATSA was also a gigantic reset button for aviation security that addressed issues that both did and didn’t have to do with 9/11 (such as checked baggage screening, air cargo screening, and airport worker background checks). It was an attempt to fix everything in the system, all at once.

Since 9/11, the TSA, while certainly not perfect, has improved security procedures and technologies significantly, particularly as compared to what we had on 9/11/01. While the TSA will never be perfect (name one organization that is) and there will always be people that slip through the gaps in the system the agency has does a decent job overall (yes, for all my criticisms in the past, it nearly pains me to say it, but they have). We now have technologies that can detect today’s threats, both in baggage and on people, and a decently paid workforce. Wait times at the screening checkpoint have reduced over time, PreCheck has expedited travel for numerous passengers and we’re at a point where the system incrementally, is still moving forward, trying to stay ahead of the next threat, while still preventing existing known threats.

Measuring Deterrence

Critics of TSA like to point to a 2015 DHS Office of the Inspector General report that stated that TSA missed 95% of the prohibited items during undercover tests. First, that report is now 10 years old. Second, we have new technologies and procedures in place since then. Third, no one really knows how many items TSA misses because people who get a prohibited item through security don’t exactly call the TSA later to tell them. The fact is, we are in the business of deterrence. Can a threat actor reasonably expect to be caught at a screening checkpoint with a prohibited item intended for use against an aircraft, to the point where it deters them from even trying? Then it’s mission accomplished. I know that’s not a high bar, but it’s the one we need to use if we’re going to push nearly three million passengers passing through screening checkpoints every day. There’s no such thing as 100% secure.

Are there problems with the system? Certainly. Stowaways in wheel wells, screening checkpoint breaches, pilots on shrooms, and other issues happen, and they need to be investigated and then we try to fill in the gaps. For the TSA detractors that point out TSA has never stopped a terrorist, well how do you know? How can you measure deterrence? How can you effectively measure the number of times someone thought about committing a terrorist or criminal act, but then decided not to because of the security measures in place? The fact is, if you want to find out how many terrorist acts the security system is deterring, get rid of the security system and the terrorists will soon let you know. Hey, I don’t like going through the process either but it’s sort of necessary if you don’t want your plane to blow up or be crashed into a building.

As an aside, I want to commend former TSA Administrator David Pekoske for doing a yeoman’s job (that’s a compliment for those of you who don’t want to look it up – it means performing their work with dedication, diligence, and reliability). While I didn’t always agree with his decisions, he took over one of the most controversial agencies in the U.S. government, that has the most interaction with the public on a daily basis, and over the course of eight years, still got the job done. I hope his successor can do just as well.

And in Conclusion

Does TSA need a makeover or restructuring? Possibly. That’s a decision better left to informed policy makers. I encourage you all to read the 9/11 Commission Report before we start dismantling the aviation security infrastructure. Or, I have a textbook out there on aviation security if you want to check it out – and no, I don’t get rich off of it. I’ll take my $3 per book royalty and head to Starbucks, but otherwise I wrote it after 9/11 because I didn’t want another 9/11 or a Pan Am 103, or an active shooter at an airport, to happen on my watch.

In his inauguration speech, President Trump stated: We will move with purpose and speed to bring back hope, prosperity, safety, and peace for citizens of every race, religion, color, and creed. Part of safety is ensuring a safe and secure aviation system. The irony is that most of those pushing to get rid of TSA are my generation, so I know you remember where you were on that fateful day. I hope that the next time you’re at a security checkpoint you remember your history and remember why the TSA, and the entire aviation security system, exist.

In honor of the 2,997 people killed on 9/11, plus hundreds more who died of illnesses as a result of searching through the wreckage, and hundreds more possibly killed on U.S., highways the following year because they were afraid to fly, and the family members and friends directly affected by this tragedy, let’s actually NEVER FORGET.

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mike-lee-continues-calling-abolition-tsa

By Jeffrey C. Price